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In Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963) domain, there are two types of mixtures. One
is an ex–ante mixture, or a lottery on acts. The other is an ex–post mixture, or a state–
wise mixture of acts. These two mixtures have been assumed to be indiﬀerent under
the Reversal of Order axiom. However, we argue that the diﬀerence between these two
mixtures is crucial in some important contexts. Under ambiguity aversion, an ex–ante
mixture could provide only ex–ante hedging but not ex–post hedging. Under inequality
aversion, an ex–ante mixture could provide only ex–ante equality but not ex–post equal-
ity. For each context, we develop a model that treats a preference for ex–ante mixtures
separately from a preference for ex–post mixtures. One representation is an extension
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1of Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) Maxmin preferences. The other representation is an
extension of Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) Piecewise–linear preferences. In both represen-
tations, a single parameter characterizes a preference for ex–ante mixtures. For the both
representations, instead of the Reversal of Order axiom, we propose a weaker axiom, the
Indiﬀerence axiom, which is a criterion, suggested in Raiﬀa’s (1961) critique, for eval-
uating lotteries on acts. These models are consistent with much recent experimental
evidence in each context.
Keywords: Ambiguity; randomization; Ellsberg paradox; other–regarding preferences;
inequality; maxmin utility.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates a preference for randomization. People exhibit such a preference
as a form of hedging because of ambiguity aversion, as Raiﬀa (1961) suggests in his famous
critique. In addition, in a social context, people exhibit such a preference because of inequality
aversion, as in the case of “Machina’s (1989) mom” who prefers ﬂipping a coin to decide how
to allocate an indivisible good among her children.1
Despite the importance of such preferences, little work has been done on this preference
for randomization. Recently, however, experimental researchers have begun to study such a
preference in each context of aversion. One important observation drawn from such experi-
mental studies is that timing of randomization matters, as will be discussed in detail later.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an axiomatic model, which describes such a preference
in each context in a uniﬁed way.
In one sense, the seminal paper by Anscombe and Aumann (1963) addresses the issue of
timing of randomization. They consider two types of randomization depending on timings;
One is an ex–ante mixture, or a lottery on payoﬀ proﬁles. For example, P in Figure 1 is the
ﬁfty–ﬁfty ex–ante mixture of ($100;$0) and ($0;$100). This type of mixture is henceforth
1Diamond (1967) proposes a similar argument for this preference for randomization.
2indicated by ⊕. The other is an ex–post mixture, or a state–wise mixture of payoﬀ proﬁles.
l : :5($100;$0) + :5($0;$100) ≡
:5










P : :5($100;$0) ⊕ :5($0;$100) ≡
Figure 1: Ex–ante Mixture P and Ex–post Mixture l
For example, l in Figure 1 is the ﬁfty–ﬁfty ex–post mixture of ($100;$0) and ($0;$100). This
type of mixture is henceforth indicated by +, as in conventional literature.
However, one diﬃculty inherent in using Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963) approach for
studying a preference for randomization is that under the Reversal of Order axiom, an ex–ante
mixture is identiﬁed with its ex–post mixture, i.e., ®f ⊕ (1 − ®)g ∼ ®f + (1 − ®)g for any
payoﬀ proﬁles f and g, and, ® ∈ [0;1]. Hence, this axiom precludes the study of a preference
for ex–ante mixtures separately from a preference for ex–post mixtures. For example, the
Reversal of Order axiom implies that P and l are indiﬀerent.
For the above reason, we do not assume the Reversal of Order axiom. Instead, we propose
a weaker axiom, the Indiﬀerence axiom. To see the diﬀerence between these axioms, notice
that one way to justify the Reversal of Order axiom is state–wise evaluation; if you look at P,
state–wise, it oﬀers the same lottery as l, at each state. There is, however, another natural
way of evaluation; if you look at P, at each payoﬀ proﬁle in the support, it oﬀers nonconstant
payoﬀ proﬁles, namely ($100;$0) and ($0;$100), which would be less attractive than the
constant payoﬀ proﬁle l under ambiguity aversion as well as under inequality aversion;2 this
way of evaluation is called support–wise evaluation. The Indiﬀerence axiom states that if
two lotteries on payoﬀ proﬁles are indiﬀerent according to both the state–wise and support–
wise criteria, then the lotteries should be indiﬀerent. As will be explained in Section 1.1.1,
the axiom is a weaker formalization of Raiﬀa’s (1961) argument in his famous critique of
2In a social context, under which inequality aversion matters, states are reinterpreted as individuals. So,
the nonconstant payoﬀ proﬁles entail ex post inequality.
3ambiguity aversion; The axiom also has a natural interpretation in the context of inequality
aversion, as will be explained in Section 1.1.2.
Using this new Indiﬀerence axiom together with standard axioms, we characterize Ex–
ante/Ex–Post (EAP) preferences that capture a preference for ex–ante mixtures and also, but
separately, a preference for ex–post mixtures; for any ex–ante mixture P on payoﬀ proﬁles f,








where a real–valued function U on the set F of payoﬀ proﬁles captures a preference for ex–
post mixtures. Moreover, it will be shown that a real number ± captures a preference for
ex–ante mixtures. The payoﬀ proﬁle (Ps)s∈S oﬀers the marginal distribution Ps of P in each




s is the payoﬀ on the state s in the payoﬀ proﬁle fi and P(fi) is the probability assigned to
fi.
In particular, we propose two tractable special cases of EAP preferences for each context
respectively; For ambiguity aversion, we axiomatize EAP Maxmin preference, in which U
is Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) Maxmin preference, shown as (3) in Section 1.1.1. For
inequality aversion, on the other hand, we axiomatize EAP Piecewise–linear preference, in
which U is Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) Piecewise–linear preference, shown as (5) in Section
1.1.2. This is because, as many experimental studies have found, inequality averse preferences
are nonmonotonic with respect to prize, so that Maxmin preferences are inconsistent with such
preferences.3 Although these two preferences have completely diﬀerent representations in U,
the axioms which characterize these preferences are similar. In addition, as noted, the same
Indiﬀerence axiom is essential for both characterizations.
Note that if ± = 1, then EAP preferences represented by (1) implies the Reversal of Order
axiom. If ± < 1, then the preferences can distinguish between P and l in Figure 1. Given
3In the paper we focus on an agent’s inequality aversion, not on a social planner’s inequality aversion, in
response to recent rich experimental ﬁnding on the former. So, the robust experimental evidence, drawn from
ultimatum games, that recipients reject positive but unfair oﬀers shows the nonmonotonicity. On the other
hand, for a social planner, it would be reasonable to assume monotonic preferences, so that EAP Maxmin
preferences would be consistent with a social planner’s inequality averse preferences.
4that our purpose is to develop a model which can distinguish between P and l, one might
wonder why it does not suﬃce to consider the simpler special case in which ± = 0. However,
it is easy to see that the special case implies the Independence axiom on ex–ante mixtures so
that there is no strict preference for ex–ante mixtures.
The remainder of Section 1 is organized as follows: Section 1.1 provides an overview of the
main results on ambiguity aversion and inequality aversion. After that, Section 1.2 reviews
some experimental evidence on a preference for ex–ante mixtures under the two types of
aversion. Next, in Section 1.3, the related literature is discussed. Section 2 then introduces
the setup. The axioms that characterize EAP Maxmin preferences are in Section 3, while
Section 4 presents the axioms that characterize EAP Piecewise–linear preferences. In Section
5, EAP Maxmin and EAP Piecewise–linear preferences are applied to games. Finally in
Section 6, further relationships among the axioms of Anscombe and Aumann (1963), Seo
(2009), and our model are discussed. All proofs are in the appendix.
1.1 Main Results
1.1.1 Ambiguity Aversion
The Ellsberg (1961) paradox has raised questions about subjective expected utility models.
He proposed the following thought experiment. Consider two urns, one of which we call
objective and the other of which we call ambiguous. Each urn contains 100 balls, each of
which is either red or black. The objective urn contains 50 black and 50 red balls. There is
no further information about the contents of the ambiguous urn. You ﬁrst decide which urn
you will draw from; then you bet on the color of the ball that you will draw, and you then
draw a ball. If your bet turns out to be correct, you will get $100. Typically, subjects strictly
prefer the objective urn than the ambiguous urn. This behavior is called ambiguity aversion.
Widely–used preferences that are consistent with ambiguity aversion are Maxmin prefer-






5where S is the set of states, C is a subset of the set ∆(S) of all ﬁnitely additive probabilities
on S, and u is a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function.
Raiﬀa (1961) criticizes ambiguity averse preferences based on the state–wise evaluation:
By ﬂipping a coin to choose a color in the ambiguous urn, you can obtain an ex–ante mixture





Bet on Red ($0 ; $100)






Figure 2: Raiﬀa’s Critique
that the objective urn oﬀers, namely, that shown as l in Figure 2. So, P and l should be
indiﬀerent. Hence, there is no reason why you strictly prefer the objective urn.
As Raiﬀa’s (1961) argument suggests, some people might prefer ﬂipping a coin and then
deciding. Note that such people have a preference for ex–ante mixtures and violate the
Independence axiom on such mixtures.4 One conceivable justiﬁcation for such a preference
is that ex–ante mixtures provide hedging in the ex–ante expected payoﬀs. When a coin is
ﬂipped, the ex–ante expected payoﬀ for each color becomes a constant $50, although the
decision maker ﬁnally ends up with the ambiguous bets ex post. We call this preference
for the ex–ante mixtures ex–ante ambiguity aversion. In contrast, conventional ambiguity
aversion constitutes a preference for ex–post mixtures. Henceforth, we call this conventional
ambiguity aversion ex–post ambiguity aversion.
Recent experiments, reported in Spears (2008) and Dominiak and Schnedler (2009), have
found that subjects often have diﬀerent attitudes toward ex–ante and ex–post ambiguity.5
This evidence contradicts the Reversal of Order axiom, which implies that attitudes toward
ex–ante and ex–post ambiguity should be the same.
Using the Indiﬀerence axiom together with standard axioms used in Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989), we characterize Ex–ante/Ex–post (EAP) Maxmin preferences that capture attitudes
4The Independence axiom shows that if ($100;$0) ∼ ($0;$100), then P ∼ ($100;$0) ∼ ($0;$100).
5We discuss the experimental data further in Section 1.2.1.
6toward ex–ante ambiguity and also, but separately, attitudes toward ex–post ambiguity as
follows:



















As will be shown in Section 3, the parameter ± is an index of ex–ante ambiguity aversion.
In particular, the preferences exhibit strict ex–ante ambiguity aversion if and only if ± > 0.
The ﬁrst term of (3) represents a concern for hedging in the ex–ante expected utilities. The
second term of (3) represents a concern for hedging in the ex–post utilities.
Finally, we conclude this section by discussing further connection between the Indiﬀerence
axiom and Raiﬀa (1961)’s critique. In addition to the state–wise evaluation, he also proposes
another way for evaluating lotteries in Figure 2, which corresponds to support–wise criterion:
if you look at the acts in the support of P, all acts are ambiguous bets, namely, ($100;$0)
and ($100;$0), which are less attractive than l. So, l should be preferred over P, contrary to
the conclusion that the lotteries should be indiﬀerent, according to the state–wise criterion.
Hence, he criticizes ambiguity averse preferences for this inconsistency in the preference on
the lotteries. Note that the Indiﬀerence axiom does not lead to this inconsistency, because
the axiom requires that these lotteries are indiﬀerent according to the both criteria.
1.1.2 Inequality Aversion
Another kind of situation in which people would typically prefer ex–ante mixtures is a so-
cial environment in which inequality matters. Next is a brief review of inequality averse
preferences and then our main results.
There is overwhelming evidence that a person’s welfare is aﬀected by ex–post equality. For
example, in dictator games in which subjects have to allocate a prize between themselves and
passive recipients, many studies have found that subjects oﬀer, on average, 20 percent of the
prize to the recipients; In ultimatum games, recipients can reject the oﬀers, as opposed to
dictator games, and in case of rejection, both receive nothing. Indeed, almost half of recipients,
on average, reject oﬀers of less than 20 percent of the prize. These behavior is called inequality
7aversion. (See Fehr and Schmidt (2005) for a survey.) The fact that recipients reject positive
oﬀers shows that inequality averse preferences are nonmonotonic with respect to prize. Hence,
Maxmin preferences are not consistent with such preferences.
Widely used preferences that are consistent with inequality aversion are Piecewise–linear
preferences proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Agents with these preferences rank allo-
cations f = (f1;:::;fS) among the set S of individuals according to the criterion
U(f) = f1 −
∑
s̸=1
(®s max{fs − f1;0} + ¯s max{f1 − fs;0}); (4)
where 1 ∈ S denotes the decision maker and ®s;¯s ≥ 0 for all s ̸= 1. The parameters ®s
and ¯s can be interpreted as indices of disutility from envy and guilt toward the individual s
when the decision maker gets less and more, respectively, than the individual s.





Recipient Wins ($0 ; $100)
Dictator Wins ($100; $0)
Figure 3: Flipping a Coin with a Dictator Game
probabilistic dictator games, in which dictators have to allocate chances to win a prize, these
studies have found that a substantial fraction of subjects shared chances to win. For example,
some dictators chose ﬂipping a coin to decide the winner over being the winner for sure; in that
case, he obtains an ex–ante mixture P on allocations, as in Figure 3. See, for the experiments,
Karni, Salmon, and Sopher (2008), Bohnet, Greig, Herrmann, and Zeckhauser (2008), Bolton
and Ockenfels (forthcoming), Krawczyk and Le Lec (2008), and Kircher, Luding, and Sandroni
(2009).6
These observations suggest that decision makers have a preference for ex–ante mixtures
to maintain ex–ante equality, or equality in the expected payoﬀ.7 We call this preference for
6We discuss other experimental results in Section 1.2.2.
7Such subjects violate the Independence axiom on ex–ante mixtures. This is because the axiom implies
that if they prefer winning to losing, they should allocate the probability 1 to winning.
8ex–ante mixtures ex–ante inequality aversion. In contrast, conventional inequality aversion
constitutes a preference for ex–post mixtures. Henceforth, we call conventional inequality
aversion ex–post inequality aversion.
Using the Indiﬀerence axiom, again, together with standard axioms, we characterize Ex–
ante/Ex–post (EAP) Piecewise–linear preferences that capture ex–ante inequality aversion
and also, but separately, ex–post inequality aversion as follows:






®s max{EPu(fs) − EPu(f1);0} + ¯s max{EPu(f1) − EPu(fs);0}
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F u(fs)dP(f).8 As will be shown in Section 4, the parameter ± is an
index of ex–ante inequality aversion. In particular, the preferences exhibit strict ex–ante
inequality aversion if and only if ± > 0. The ﬁrst term represents a concern about ex–ante
equality, because the term depends on the diﬀerences in the expected utilities. The second
term captures a concern about ex–post equality, because the term depends on the diﬀerences
in the ex–post utilities. Under the assumption of the risk neutrality, EAP Piecewise–linear
preferences reduce to Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) Piecewise–linear preferences, for degenerate
lotteries on payoﬀ proﬁles.
The Indiﬀerence axiom has a natural interpretation in a social context as well, under which
states are reinterpreted as individuals. The criterion conditional on states (i.e., on individuals)
corresponds to ex–ante equality, because state–wise (i.e., individual–wise) evaluation yields the
ex–ante expected payoﬀ for each individual. On the other hand, the support–wise criterion
corresponds to ex–post equality. For example, according to the state–wise criterion, P in
Figure 3 would be indiﬀerent to a constant payoﬀ proﬁle, in which both dictator and recipient
independently obtain the ﬁfty–ﬁfty lottery of $100 and $0. This is because both P and the
payoﬀ proﬁle are equally desirable from the view point of ex–ante equality. According to the
8As noted, EAP Maxmin preferences can be consistent with a social planner’s inequality averse preferences.
It is easy to see that if ± ∈ (0;1), the model can describe the choice of “Machina’s (1989) mom” as follows:
:5(1;0) ⊕ :5(0;1) ≻ (1;0) ∼ (0;1).
9support–wise criterion, on the other hand, the constant proﬁle would be preferred over P,
because only P is not ex–post equal.
1.2 Experimental Evidence
1.2.1 Ambiguity Aversion
EAP Maxmin preferences represented by (3) are consistent with some recent experimental
evidence. Dominiak and Schnedler (2009) have studied the relationship between attitudes
toward ex–ante and ex–post ambiguity. The number in Table 1 shows the number of subjects


















Table 1: Attitudes toward Ex–ante and Ex–post Ambiguity
Dominiak and Schnedler’s (2009) experimental result might be summarized by the follow-
ing two points. First, subjects who are averse to ex–post ambiguity diﬀer in their attitudes
toward ex–ante ambiguity. Indeed, there are more ex–ante ambiguity loving subjects than
ex–ante ambiguity averse subjects. This result is inconsistent not only with the Reversal of
Order axiom but also with Raiﬀa’s (1961) critique because his claim implies that all of the
ex–post ambiguity averse decision makers should be ex–ante ambiguity averse as well. Sec-
ond, however, most of the ex–post ambiguity neutral subjects are ex–ante ambiguity neutral
as well. Although using a small sample, Spears (2008) has found similar tendencies to these.
The ﬁrst observation is explained by the heterogeneity of the parameter ± as follows.
Suppose EAP Maxmin preferences exhibit ex–post ambiguity aversion. Then, as will be
9The table excludes four subjects who exhibited ex–post ambiguity loving.
10shown in Section 3.5, the preferences exhibit ex–ante ambiguity aversion, neutrality, and
loving, if and only if ± > 0, ± = 0, and ± < 0, respectively, which is consistent with Table 1.
Hence, the heterogeneity observed in the experiment can be characterized simply by whether
or not ± is positive.
The second observation is also consistent with EAP Maxmin preferences. As will be shown
in Section 3.5, among EAP Maxmin preferences, ex–post ambiguity neutrality implies ex–ante
ambiguity neutrality for any ±, which is also consistent with Table 1.
1.2.2 Inequality Aversion
EAP Piecewise–linear preferences represented by (5) are also consistent with some recent
experimental evidence. Firstly, if ± > 0, then the preferences are consistent with the ex-
perimental evidence drawn from probabilistic dictator games, that a substantial fraction of
subjects shared chances to win because of the ex–ante equality.
Secondly, Kariv and Zame’s (2009) experiment is also consistent with suitable values of
the parameters ®;¯ and ±. In their experiments, subjects are asked to divide a budget z into
x and y such that x + qy ≤ z, where q is a given price. After the decision, the payoﬀ of the
decision maker and a recipient are determined as x or y with the probability :5, so that the
outcome is an ex–ante mixture :5(x;y) ⊕ :5(y;x). Hence, the subjects are required to make
decisions under a veil of ignorance.
One of their main ﬁndings is that most of the subjects did not allocate all funds to the
cheaper element. This fact is also consistent with EAP Piecewise-linear preferences. To see









(x + y) − (1 − ±)(® + ¯)|x − y|
]
: (6)
So, when (1 − ±)(® + ¯) exceeds a certain level, the decision maker tries to equalize x and y
even if the prices are not the same.10
10Suppose q < 1. If 1 − ± >
q¡1
(®+¯)(q+1), then EAP Piecewise-linear preferences with such parameters are
consistent with the experimental evidence that many subjects did not spend all the budget to the cheaper
element, i.e., y.
11Finally, EAP Piecewise-linear preferences are also consistent with seemingly contradictory
experimental results on eﬃciency versus inequality. In particular, a number of papers have
recently claimed that eﬃciency, or the sum of allocation across agents, has a stronger inﬂuence
than inequality. See, for example, Charness and Rabin (2002) and Engelmann and Strobel
(2004, 2006).
In particular, Charness and Rabin (2002) report that in a dictator game, almost 50 percent
of their subjects chose an eﬃcient but unequal allocation (in which the dictator obtained 375
points and the receiver obtained 750 points) to an ineﬃcient but equal allocation (in which
each player obtained 400 points). This behavior seems contradictory to any theory of ex–post
inequality aversion including Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) Piecewise–linear preferences.
The key fact that can explain the contradiction is that in the experiments that are in favor
of eﬃciency, each subject makes decisions as if he were a dictator, but the actual roles (i.e.,
dictator or receiver) are determined at random. So, the subjects face risk over roles. Indeed,
in experiments of three–person dictator games, Bolton and Ockenfels (2006) found that under
risk over roles, subjects tended to choose eﬃcient but unequal allocations over ineﬃcient but
equal allocations.11
Under the risk over roles, each subject is facing a game with the other subjects. In Section
5.2, we study a game that describes the aforementioned dictator game under the risk over
roles and show that in an equilibrium, subjects with EAP Piecewise-linear preferences choose
the eﬃcient but unequal allocation rather than the ineﬃcient but equal allocation because of
the ex–ante equality.
To understand this result intuitively, note that risk over roles plays a role similar to that
of veil of ignorance. To see this, assume that there are two subjects. Suppose both of them
decide to allocate x to themselves and y to the other. Then, under the risk over roles, what
they obtain is the ex–ante mixture :5(x;y) ⊕ :5(y;x). Thus, the utility of each subject is
11In a three–person dictator game, a dictator decides an allocation of a prize among two passive receivers
and the dictator himself.









(“eﬃciency”) − (1 − ±)(® + ¯)(“inequality”)
]
:
Hence, even if a subject cares about ex–post equality (i.e., ® and ¯ are positive), if he weighs
ex–ante equality heavily enough (i.e., ± is larger than a certain level), then his utility from
choosing the eﬃcient but unequal allocation becomes larger than his utility from choosing
the ineﬃcient but equal allocation, given that the other player chooses the same eﬃcient
allocation.12 Therefore, it looks as if the subjects with EAP Piecewise–linear preferences
care more about eﬃciency than about inequality.
1.3 Related Literature
To our knowledge, no other papers have studied a preference for ex–ante mixtures and also,
but separately, a preference for ex–post mixtures.
In terms of axiomatic structures, however, the paper that is most closely related to the
present paper is Seo (2009), in the sense that only his model and our model do not assume
the Reversal of Order axiom.13 One key feature of his model is that under his Dominance
axiom, the Reversal of Order axiom and the Reduction of Compound Lotteries axiom become
equivalent. This equivalence implies a negative result that, in his model, distinction between
ex–ante mixtures and ex–post mixtures is impossible as long as we assume rational attitude
toward reduction of compound lotteries. In contrast, under the Indiﬀerence axiom, this
incompatibility does not arise, because, as will be shown in Section 6, the Indiﬀerence axiom
is weker than the Reversal of Order axiom so as to allow the distinction between the two
types mixtures, but is still, stronger than the Reduction of Compound Lotteries axiom. In
addition, it will be shown in Section 6 that, under the Reduction of Compound Lotteries
axiom, his Dominance axiom implies the Indiﬀerence axiom but not vice versa.
In terms of applications, the present paper is related with literature on game theory
12The observation suggests ± > 0, while the observation reported by Kariv and Zame (2009) suggests ± < 1.
So, ± ∈ (0;1) can be consistent with both experiments.
13He assumes the Independence axiom on ex–ante mixtures, so that no preference for ex–ante mixture.
13that studies ambiguity averse players, in which mixed strategies corresponds to lotteries on
acts. The special cases of EAP Maxmin preferences and EAP Choquet preferences (Choquet
counterpart of EAP Maxmin), where ± = 0 or 1, have been used in the literature;14 Klibanoﬀ
(1996) and Lo (1996) have applied EAP Maxmin preferences with ± = 1; Eichberger and
Kelsey (2000) have applied EAP Choquet preferences with ± = 0; Mukerji and Shin (2002)
have applied EAP Choquet preferences with ± = 0 as well as with ± = 1. In Section 5.1, it will
be shown that, in some games, ± ∈ (0;1) would predict more realistic behavior of ambiguity
averse players than ± = 0 and 1.
Finally, in terms of motivation associated with inequality aversion, the present paper also
shed light on certain issues in the social choice literature regarding the trade–oﬀ between
equality of opportunity and equality of outcome; these issues are addressed especially in Ben–
Porath, Gilboa, and Schmeidler (1997) and Gajdos and Maurin (2004).15 However, the models
and motivations in both papers are diﬀerent from ours. These papers have considered a social
planner’s preferences on matrices of real numbers that are utilities over a product space that
consists of states and individuals. Hence, in their model, there is no conceptual counterpart of
ex–ante mixtures.16 In addition, as noted, our emphasis in the paper is an agent’s inequality
aversion, not a social planner’s inequality aversion, in response to recent rich experimental
evidence on the former; the present paper is the ﬁrst paper apart from Saito (2008) to provide
an axiomatization of Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) Piecewise-linear preferences.
2 Setup
For any topological space X, let ∆(X) be the set of distributions over X with ﬁnite supports.
An element in ∆(X) is called a lottery on X. Let ±x ∈ ∆(X) denote a point mass on x.
Let S be a set of states and let Σ be an algebra of subsets of S. Let Z denote a set of
14Since Choquet expected utilities with convex capacity have Maxmin representation, it is trivial–given the
axiomatization of EAP Maxmin preferences–to axiomatize EAP Choquet preferences with convex capacities.
15Ben–Porath et al. (1997) do not study axiomatization. Gajdos and Maurin (2004) axiomatize a weaker
representation than the one used in Ben–Porath et al. (1997). The representations and axioms proposed by
Gajdos and Maurin (2004) are diﬀerent from ours.
16Mixing two matrices in their model conceptually corresponds to an ex–post mixture in our model.
14outcomes. Both set S and set Z are assumed to be nonempty. A payoﬀ proﬁle f is called an
act and deﬁned to be a Σ-measurable bounded function from S into ∆(Z). For each act f,
we write fs ∈ ∆(Z), instead of f(s). Let F be the set of all acts.
A preference relation   is deﬁned on ∆(F). As usual, ≻ and ∼ denote, respectively, the
asymmetric and symmetric parts of  . A constant act is an act f such that fs = f′
s for all
s;s′ ∈ S. Elements in ∆(F) are denoted by P;Q, and R. For all P ∈ ∆(F), supp P is the
support of P. Elements in F are denoted by f;g , and h. Elements in ∆(Z) are denoted by
l;q;r and are identiﬁed as constant acts. For f ∈ F, an element lf ∈ ∆(Z) is a certainty
equivalent for f if f ∼ lf.
Finally, ex–ante mixtures and ex–ante mixtures are formally deﬁned as follows;
Definition: For all ® ∈ [0;1] and P;Q ∈ ∆(F), ®P ⊕(1−®)Q ∈ ∆(F) is a lottery on acts
such that (®P ⊕(1−®)Q)(f) = ®P(f)+(1−®)Q(f) ∈ [0;1] for each f ∈ F. This operation
is called an ex–ante mixture. For degenerate lotteries on acts, we write ®f ⊕(1−®)g ∈ ∆(F),
instead of ®±f ⊕ (1 − ®)±g, for any ® ∈ [0;1], and f;g ∈ F.
Definition: For all ® ∈ [0;1] and f;g ∈ F, ®f + (1 − ®)g ∈ F is an act such that
(®f + (1 − ®)g)(s) = ®fs + (1 − ®)gs ∈ ∆(Z) for each s ∈ S. This operation is called an
ex–post mixture.
3 Ex–ante/Ex–post Maxmin Preferences
We now discuss ambiguity averse preferences. Instead of Reversal of Order, we assume Indif-
ference as well as the axioms used in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
3.1 Axioms
The ﬁrst six axioms are due to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). However, since Reversal of
Order is not assumed, both Continuity and Certainty Independence are assumed for ex–ante
mixtures and also, but separately, for ex–post mixtures.
Axiom 1 (Weak Order):   is complete and transitive.
15Axiom 2 (Continuity):
(i) For all P;Q;R ∈ ∆(F), if P ≻ Q and Q ≻ R, then there are ® and ¯ in (0;1) such that
®P ⊕ (1 − ®)R ≻ Q and Q ≻ ¯P ⊕ (1 − ¯)R.
(ii) For all f;g;h ∈ F, if f ≻ g and g ≻ h, then there are ® and ¯ in (0;1) such that
®f + (1 − ®)h ≻ g and g ≻ ¯f + (1 − ¯)h.
Axiom 3 (Monotonicity): For all f;g ∈ F,
fs   gs for all s ∈ S ⇒ f   g:
If a preference relation   satisﬁes Axioms 1–3, then each act f ∈ F admits a certainty
equivalent lf ∈ ∆(Z).
Axiom 4 (Nondegeneracy): There exist z+;z− ∈ Z such that z+ ≻ z−.
Axiom 5 (Ex–post Ambiguity Aversion): For all ® ∈ [0;1] and f;g ∈ F,
f ∼ g ⇒ ®f + (1 − ®)g   f:
Mixing constant acts, ex–ante as well as ex–post, does not provide any hedging. Hence,
Axiom 6 (Ex–ante/Ex–post Certainty Independence):
(i) For all ® ∈ (0;1], P;Q ∈ ∆(F), and l ∈ ∆(Z),
P   Q ⇔ ®P ⊕ (1 − ®)l   ®Q ⊕ (1 − ®)l:
(ii) For all ® ∈ (0;1], f;g ∈ F, and l ∈ ∆(Z),
f   g ⇔ ®f + (1 − ®)l   ®g + (1 − ®)l:
The ﬁnal axiom is a weaker formalization of Raiﬀa’s (1961) critique. As we saw in Intro-
duction, he proposes two criteria. One is state–wise and the other is support–wise. First, to
formalize the state–wise criterion, a preliminary concept is deﬁned here:








where P = P(f1)f1 ⊕ ··· ⊕ P(fn)fn.
In words, Ps is a reduced marginal distribution of P on s. Kreps (1988, p. 106) as well as
Raiﬀa (1961) have proposed an act (Ps)s∈S, which oﬀers Ps at each state s, as a reasonable
embedding of P ∈ ∆(F) to F. Henceforth, we write (Ps)s, instead of (Ps)s∈S for simplicity.
The next embedding corresponds to the support–wise criterion; remember that lf ∈ ∆(Z)
is a certainty equivalent for an act f.
Definition: For all P ∈ ∆(F),
lP = P(f
1)lf1 + ··· + P(f
n)lfn;
where P = P(f1)f1 ⊕ ··· ⊕ P(fn)fn.17




(i) (Ps)s ∼ (Qs)s; and
(ii) lP ∼ lQ

 ⇒ P ∼ Q:
Indiﬀerence states that if two lotteries on acts are indiﬀerent according to the two criteria
jointly, then the lotteries should be indiﬀerent. As will be shown in Section 6, a stronger
axiom without the condition (ii), which will be called State–wise Indiﬀerence, is equivalent
to Reversal of Order.
As noted, Raiﬀa (1961) applies the two criteria independently as opposed to Indiﬀerence.
To see the diﬀerences formally, consider two lotteries on acts in Figure 4; Since (Ps)s = (Qs)s,
P and Q are indiﬀerent according to State–wise Indiﬀerence. So, Raiﬀa would conclude that
P and Q should be indiﬀerent. According to the support–wise criterion, on the other hand,
17Note that, in general, it is not true that P ∼ lP. However, for a degenerate lottery on acts, f ∼ l±f ≡ lf.













































Figure 4: State–wise Criterion and Support–wise Criterion
Q is better than P, because, under ambiguity aversion, lQ = ($100;:5; $0;:5) ≻ ($100;$0) ∼
($0;$100) ∼ lP. Hence, Indiﬀerence does not require indiﬀerence between P and Q.18
3.2 Representation
Before stating the result, we mention that the topology to be used on the space of ﬁnitely
additive set functions on Σ is the weak* topology.
Theorem 1: For a preference relation   on ∆(F), the following statements are equivalent:
(i) The preference relation satisﬁes Axioms 1–7.
(ii) There exist a real number ±, a nonempty convex closed set C of ﬁnitely additive probability
measures on Σ, and a nonconstant mixture linear function u : ∆(Z) → R, such that   is
represented by the function V : ∆(F) → R of the form



















Definition: A preference relation   on ∆(F) is called an Ex–ante/Ex–post (EAP) Maxmin
preference if it satisﬁes Axioms 1–7.
18Indeed, if Indiﬀerence is strengthened to apply (i) and (ii) independently as in Raiﬀa (1961) (that is,
(i) or (ii) ⇒ P ∼ Q), then Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963) subjective expected utility is obtained in
Theorem 1.
18By Theorem 1, EAP Maxmin preferences can be represented by a triple (±;C;u). Next,
we give the uniqueness property of this representation.
Corollary 1: The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) Two triples (±;C;u) and (±′;C′;u′) represent the same EAP Maxmin preference as in
Theorem 1.
(ii) (a) C = C′, and there exist real numbers ® and ¯ such that ® > 0 and u = ®u′ + ¯; and
(b) If C is nondegenerate, then ± = ±′.
3.3 Ex–ante and Interim Ambiguity Aversion and ±
The parameter ± has a direct behavioral characterization in terms of Ex–ante Ambiguity
Aversion and Interim Ambiguity Aversion:
Axiom (Ex–ante Ambiguity Aversion): For all ® ∈ (0;1) and f;g ∈ F,
f ∼ g ⇒ ®f ⊕ (1 − ®)g   f:
Ex–ante Ambiguity Neutrality and Ex–ante Ambiguity Loving are deﬁned in the same way
by changing the right–hand side of the deﬁnition to ®f⊕(1−®)g ∼ f and to f   ®f⊕(1−®)g,
respectively.
Axiom (Interim Ambiguity Aversion): For all ® ∈ (0;1) and f;g ∈ F,
®f + (1 − ®)g   ®f ⊕ (1 − ®)g:
Interim Ambiguity Aversion means that an ex–post mixture is preferred over its ex–ante
mixture. This is because an ex–post mixture provides hedging in the ex–post utilities, whereas
an ex–ante mixture provides hedging only in the ex–ante expected utilities. In addition,
Interim Ambiguity Neutrality is deﬁned in the same way by changing   to ∼.
Proposition 1: Suppose   is EAP Maxmin preference with nondegenerate C.
(i)   exhibits Ex–ante Ambiguity Aversion if and only if ± ≥ 0.
(ii)   exhibits Interim Ambiguity Aversion if and only if ± ≤ 1.
19Note that given the representation, it is easy to see that EAP Maxmin preference with
± = 0 and ± = 1 satisﬁes Ex–ante Ambiguity Neutrality and Interim Ambiguity Neutrality,
respectively.
3.4 Comparative Attitudes toward Ex–ante Ambiguity
We now study comparative attitudes toward ex–ante ambiguity.
Definition: Given two preference relations  1 and  2,  1 is said to be more Ex–ante
Ambiguity Averse than  2 if, for every P ∈ ∆(F) and every f ∈ F,
P  2 f ⇒ P  1 f:
The next proposition shows that ± captures attitude toward ex–ante ambiguity.
Proposition 2: Suppose two EAP Maxmin preferences { i}i=1;2 are represented by {(±i;Ci;
ui)}i=1;2, where C1 and C2 are nondegenerate. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(i)  1 is more Ex–ante Ambiguity Averse than  2.
(ii) ±1 ≥ ±2, C1 = C2, and there exist real numbers ® and ¯ such that ® > 0 and u1 = ®u2+¯.
Therefore, Proposition 2 says that a stronger Ex–ante Ambiguity Averse preference is
characterized by larger values of ±. Therefore, ± can be interpreted as an index of Ex–ante
Ambiguity Aversion.
3.5 Relationship between Attitudes toward Ex–ante and Ex–post
Ambiguity
As Table 1 in Section 1.2.1 shows, Dominiak and Schnedler (2009) have found that among ex–
post ambiguity averse subjects, the attitude toward ex–ante ambiguity is quite heterogeneous,
but that most Ex–post Ambiguity Neutral subjects are Ex–ante Ambiguity Neutral as well.
These results are formally described by EAP Maxmin preferences as follows:
Proposition 3: Suppose   is EAP Maxmin preference.
20(i) (a) Suppose ± > 0. Then,   exhibits Ex–post Ambiguity Aversion if and only if   exhibits
Ex–ante Ambiguity Aversion.
(b) Suppose ± < 0. Then,   exhibits Ex–post Ambiguity Aversion if and only if   exhibits
Ex–ante Ambiguity Loving.
(c) Suppose ± = 0. Then,   exhibits Ex–ante Ambiguity Neutrality.
(ii) For any ±, if   exhibits Ex–post Ambiguity Neutrality, then   exhibits Ex–ante Ambiguity
Neutrality.
Part (i) shows that the heterogeneity observed in the experiment can be described by
whether or not ± is positive. Part (ii) shows that among EAP Maxmin preferences, Ex–post
Ambiguity Neutrality implies Ex–ante Ambiguity Neutrality, as observed in the experiment.
4 Ex–ante/Ex–post Piecewise–linear Preferences
We now examine inequality averse preferences. Accordingly, the set S of states are assumed
to be ﬁnite and reinterpreted as individuals including a decision maker, who is denoted by
1 ∈ S.
4.1 Axioms
The axioms for EAP Maxmin preferences are now modiﬁed to capture inequality aversion.
No modiﬁcation is necessary for Indiﬀerence, and the ﬁrst three modiﬁcations required are
minor.
To capture inequality aversion, Monotonicity (Axiom 3) needs to be weakened as follows:
Axiom 3′ (Substitution): For all f;g ∈ F,
fs ∼ gs for all s ∈ S ⇒ f ∼ g:
Nondegeneracy (Axiom 4) is strengthened into Unboundedness, which requires that there
are arbitrarily good and arbitrarily bad outcomes as follows:
21Axiom 4′ (Unboundedness): There are z+;z− ∈ Z such that for each ® ∈]0;1[ there exist
z;z′ ∈ Z such that ®±z + (1 − ®)±z− ≻ z+ ≻ z− ≻ ®±z′ + (1 − ®)±z+. 19
Since Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) Piecewise–linear preferences imply the risk neutrality, the
preferences satisﬁes Unboundedness.
The third minor change in the axioms is that the following axiom is assumed instead of
Ex–post Ambiguity Aversion (Axiom 5). In order to deﬁne the axiom, preliminary notations
are introduced; Let l0 = 1
2±z+ + 1
2±z−. For any lottery l;r ∈ ∆(Z) and s ∈ S, (l;(r)−s) is an
act which oﬀers l for the individual s and oﬀers r for the other individuals.
Axiom 5′ (Ex–post Inequality Aversion): For all s ̸= 1,
(i) (l0;(l0)−s)   (z+;(l0)−s) ; and
(ii) (l0;(l0)−s)   (z−;(l0)−s).
Part (i) captures the disutility that results from envy toward the individual s when only
the individual s is better oﬀ than the decision maker. Part (ii) captures the disutility that
results from guilt toward the individual s when only the individual s is worse oﬀ than the
decision maker.
The main axiom that requires a modiﬁcation is Ex–ante/Ex–post Certainty Independence.
Speciﬁcally, a new concept of pointwise comonotonicity needs to be deﬁned, which is a weaker
version of comonotonicity. Remember that 1 ∈ S denotes the decision maker.
Definition: Two acts f;g ∈ F are said to be pointwise comonotonic if for no s ∈ S,
f(s) ≻ f(1) and g(s) ≺ g(1).
Suppose two acts f and g are pointwise comonotonic. Then, the rank of utilities of any
individual with respect to the decision maker is not reversed between f and g.20 Hence,
Axiom 6′ (Ex–ante/Ex–post Pointwise Comonotonic Independence):
(i) For all ® ∈ (0;1] and P;Q;R ∈ ∆(F) such that (Ps)s;(Rs)s, and (Qs)s;(Rs)s are each
19This axiom is due to Cerreia–Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio (2008).
20Schmeidler (1989, p. 586) has presented an interpretation of comonotonicity from the point of view of
a planner’s social preference: two income allocations f and g are comonotonic if the social rank of any two
agents is not reversed between f and g. When we focus on an agent’s inequality averse preferences, what is
relevant to the agent is social rank with respect to the agent himself, not the social rank of any two agents.
22pointwise comonotonic,
P   Q ⇔ ®P ⊕ (1 − ®)R   ®Q ⊕ (1 − ®)R:
(ii) For all ® ∈ (0;1] and f;g;h ∈ F such that f;h, and g;h are each pointwise comonotonic,
f   g ⇔ ® f + (1 − ®)h   ®g + (1 − ®)h:
As noted, no modiﬁcation is necessary for Indiﬀerence. The interpretation of that axiom
is straightforward here. The ﬁrst criterion (i) corresponds to ex–ante equality, because each
marginal distribution Ps yields the ex–ante expected payoﬀ of the individual s. The second
criterion (ii) corresponds to ex–post equality, because each certainty equivalent lf reﬂects the
ex–post equality of f. Hence, Indiﬀerence means that if P and Q are indiﬀerent in the both
ex–ante and ex–post equality, then P and Q should be indiﬀerent.
4.2 Representation
Theorem 2: For a preference relation   on ∆(F), the following statements are equivalent:
(i) The preference relation satisﬁes Axioms 1, 2, 3’, 4’, 5’, 6’, and 7.
(ii) There exist a real number ±, nonnegative numbers {®s;¯s}s̸=1, and a nonconstant mixture
linear onto function u : ∆(Z) → R such that   is represented by the function V : ∆(F) → R
of the form






®s max{EPu(fs) − EPu(f1);0} + ¯s max{EPu(f1) − EPu(fs);0}
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F u(fs)dP(f). Furthermore, the two quadruples (±;®;¯;u) and (±′;®′;¯′;u′)
represent the same preference as in the above if and only if (®;¯) = (®′;¯′), ± = ±′ if
(®;¯) ̸= 0, and there exist real numbers a and b such that a > 0 and u = au′ + b.
Definition: A preference relation   on ∆(F) is called an Ex–ante/Ex–post (EAP) Piecewise–
23linear preference if it satisﬁes Axioms 1, 2, 3′;4′;5′;6′, and 7.
4.3 Ex–ante and Interim Inequality Aversion and ±
The parameter ± has a direct behavioral characterization in terms of both Ex–ante Inequality
Aversion and Interim Inequality Aversion, as follows:
Axiom(Ex–ante Inequality Aversion):For all s ̸= 1 and l+;l− ∈ ∆(Z) such that l+ ≻ l0 ≻ l−.






(l−;(l0)−s)   (l+;(l0)−s):
With the allocation (l+;(l0)−s), the decision maker feels envy toward the individual s
because only the individual s is better oﬀ; while with the allocation (l−;(l0)−s), the decision
maker feels guilt toward the individual s because only the individual s is worse oﬀ. Ex–ante
Inequality Aversion means that an ex–ante mixture of these allocations partly oﬀsets these
inequalities in the expected utilities. So, the ex–ante mixture becomes more desirable.21 In
addition, Ex–ante Inequality Neutrality is deﬁned by changing the right–hand side of the
deﬁnition above to 1
2(l+;(l0)−s) ⊕ 1
2(l−;(l0)−s) ∼ (l+;(l0)−s).













To interpret Interim Inequality Aversion, recall that l0 = 1
2±z+ + 1
2±z−. Hence, the ex–ante
mixture in the right hand side could provide ex–ante equality but not ex–post equality, as
opposed to the ex–post mixture in the left hand side. So, the ex–post mixture is preferred
over the ex–ante mixture. In addition, Interim Inequality Neutrality is deﬁned by changing  
to ∼.
Corollary 2: Suppose   is EAP Piecewise–linear preference with (®;¯) ̸= 0.
21Ex–ante Inequality Aversion is consistent with the experimental evidence, drawn from the probabilistic
dictator games, that subjects who are indiﬀerent between winning and losing tend to prefer ﬂipping a coin to
decide the winner.
24(i)   exhibits Ex–ante Inequality Aversion if and only if ± ≥ 0.
(ii)   exhibits Interim Inequality Aversion if and only if ± ≤ 1.
Note that given the representation, it is easy to see that EAP Piecewise–linear preferences
with ± = 0 and ± = 1 satisfy Ex–ante Inequality Neutrality and Interim Inequality Neutrality,
respectively.
4.4 Comparative Attitudes toward Ex–ante Inequality
As mentioned in Introduction, a preference for ex–ante mixtures is due to Ex–ante Inequality
Aversion in a social context, in contrast to ambiguous situations, in which such a preference is
due to Ex–ante Ambiguity Aversion. So, the same deﬁnition of being more Ex–ante Ambiguity
Averse in Section 3.4 is interpreted as the deﬁnition of being more Ex–ante Inequality Averse
in a social context.
Hence, results analogous to those derived from Proposition 2 in Section 3.4 also hold for
inequality aversion.
Corollary 3: Suppose two EAP Piecewise–linear preferences { i}i=1;2 are represented by
{(±i;®i;¯i;ui)}i=1;2, where (®1;¯1) ̸= 0 ̸= (®2;¯2). Then the following statements are equiv-
alent:
(i)  1 is more Ex–ante Inequality Averse than  2.
(ii) ±1 ≥ ±2, (®1;¯1) = (®2;¯2), and there exist real numbers a and b such that a > 0 and
u1 = au2 + b.
Therefore, Corollary 3 says that a stronger Ex–ante Inequality Averse preference is charac-
terized by larger values of ±. Therefore, ± can be interpreted as an index of Ex–ante Inequality
Aversion in a social context.
5 Games
In preceding sections, we saw how EAP Maxmin and EAP Piecewise–linear preferences are
consistent with many experimental results, mainly on single-person decision making. In this
25section, EAP Maxmin and EAP Piecewise–linear preferences are applied to games in order
to see the implications of the models in strategic situations.
5.1 EAP Maxmin Preferences in Games
As noted in Introduction, the special cases of EAP Maxmin and EAP Choquet preferences,
where ± = 0 or 1 have been used in the game theory literature on ambiguity averse players.22
The following two symmetric games, Game I and Game II, suggest that ± ∈ (0;1) would
predict more realistic behavior of ambiguity averse players than ± = 0 and 1, respectively.







c x − " x − "
Game I Game II
For both games, when they are played for the ﬁrst time, the symmetry makes it diﬃcult
for each player to have a unique prior probability over the opponent’s strategies. So, in Game
I, the ambiguity averse players would prefer mixed strategies to pure strategies in order to
hedge. In addition, in Game II, if a positive number " is less than a certain threshold, player
1 would prefer strategy c, whose payoﬀ is constant, to any mixed strategies over a and b.
EAP Maxmin preferences with ± ∈ (0;1) can describe these reasonable behaviors in a
strict equilibrium in each game.23 However, EAP Maxmin preferences with ± = 0 show that
a ∼ b ⇒ :5a ⊕ :5b ∼ a and d ∼ e ⇒ :5d ⊕ :5e ∼ d, so that for both players, there are no
strict incentives to use the mixed strategies in Game I. In addition, EAP Maxmin preferences
22To see the relationship between the literature and our model, ﬁx a game and a player. Then, the player’s
pure strategy corresponds to an act; the set of strategies of the other players corresponds to the set of states;
hence, the player’s mixed strategy corresponds to ex–ante mixtures on acts.
23See Klibanoﬀ (1996) for a deﬁnition of an equilibrium with ambiguity averse players. He assumes ± = 1
but the deﬁnition is easily applied to EAP Maxmin preferences with ± ̸= 1.
26with ± = 1 show that :5a ⊕ :5b ≻ c for any small positive number ", so strategy c will not be
employed by player 1 in Game II.
5.2 EAP Piecewise–linear Preferences in Games
In this section, we show that EAP Piecewise–linear preferences can describe seemingly con-
tradictory experimental results on eﬃciency versus inequality. As mentioned in Introduction,
the key to resolving the putative contradiction is that it is only in the experiments that are
strongly in favor of eﬃciency that subjects are under risk over roles. That is, in the experi-
ments, each subject makes a decision as if he were a dictator, but actual roles (i.e., dictator
or receiver) are determined at random.
We study a Bayesian game that describes the dictator game from Charness and Rabin
(2002), mentioned in Section 1.2.2. In the game, they report that about 50 percent of the
subjects chose the eﬃcient but unequal allocation rather than the ineﬃcient but equal allo-
cation. Assume, for simplicity, there exist two players {1;2} and two types of players: fair








, where the ﬁrst
and second coordinates show the material prizes for players 1 and 2, respectively. Denote the


















Figure 5: Dictator Games with and without Risk–over–roles
described as Game I in Figure 5.
In Game I, the player’s choice determines outcomes only if he turns out to be a dictator.
Given that each role is determined with the probability :5, outcomes are ﬁfty–ﬁfty ex–ante
mixtures on allocations. For example, if player 1 chooses action Ef and player 2 chooses Eq,
27the outcome is an ex–ante mixture that gives (375;750) and (400;400) with the probability
:5. Game I is diﬀerent from Game II, since there is no risk over roles in the latter. That is,
in Game II, player 1 knows that he is a dictator for sure. Now the result can be stated as
follows:
Proposition 4: Suppose
(a) Players’ preferences are EAP Piecewise–linear with u(z) = logz for all z ∈ R+.
(b) There exist two types, fair (i:e:;®F;¯F > 0;and ±F > 0) and selﬁsh (i:e:;®S = 0 = ¯S).
Let ®F = :2, ¯F = :9, and ±F = :85. Then the following results hold:
(i) In Game I, there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which the fair type choose the
eﬃcient payoﬀ (Ef), the selﬁsh type choose the equal payoﬀ (Eq), and the common prior
probability on the fair type is :5.
(ii) In Game II, for both types, choosing the equal payoﬀ (Eq) strictly dominates choosing
the eﬃcient payoﬀ (Ef).
Note that in the result (i), the common prior probability on the fair type is consistent
with the experimental evidence found by Charness and Rabin (2002), who report that about
50 percent of the subjects chose Ef.
Having subjects make decisions under risk over roles is currently prevalent in experimental
research because it makes the number of samples much larger. However, Proposition 4 shows
that risk over roles makes subjects with EAP Piecewise–linear preferences tend to choose
the eﬃcient allocations, even if they do not have a preference for eﬃciency itself. This is
consistent with the experimental evidence, found by Bolton and Ockenfels (2006), that under
risk over roles, subjects tend to choose eﬃcient but unequal allocations over ineﬃcient but
equal allocations.
6 Discussion
In this section, the relationships among the key axioms used in Anscombe and Aumann
(1963), Seo (2009), and our model are discussed. In particular, we will show that Reversal of
28Order implies Indiﬀerence but not vice versa, and Indiﬀerence, in turn, implies Reduction of
Compound Lotteries but not vice versa.
First, Reversal of Order by Anscombe and Aumann (1963) is formally deﬁned;
Axiom (Reversal of Order): For all ® ∈ (0;1], and f;g ∈ F,
®f + (1 − ®)g ∼ ®f ⊕ (1 − ®)g:
As noted, Reversal of Order turns out to be equivalent to the following axiom:
Axiom (State–wise Indiﬀerence): For all P;Q ∈ ∆(F),
(Ps)s ∼ (Qs)s ⇒ P ∼ Q:
Lemma 1: Reversal of Order and State–wise Indiﬀerence are equivalent.
Note that State–wise Indiﬀerence is a strengthening of Indiﬀerence by dropping the re-
quirement of the support–wise criterion. Hence,
Corollary 4: Reversal of Order implies Indiﬀerence.
It is easy to see that the opposite of Corollary 4 is not true. However, Indiﬀerence implies
Reversal of Order among constant acts. Formally,
Axiom (Reduction of Compound Lotteries): For all ® ∈ [0;1] and l;r ∈ ∆(Z),
®l + (1 − ®)r ∼ ®l ⊕ (1 − ®)r:
Lemma 2: Indiﬀerence implies Reduction of Compound Lotteries.
As noted, Seo (2009) also does not assume Reversal of Order and, instead, proposes an
axiom of his own, Dominance. To present the axiom, we must ﬁrst introduce preliminary
notations. For each f ∈ F and ¹ ∈ ∆(S), ª(f;¹) = ¹(s1)fs1 +···+¹(s|S|)fs|S| ∈ ∆(Z).24 In
addition, for each P ∈ ∆(F) and ¹ ∈ ∆(S), ª(P;¹) = P(f1)ª(f1;¹)⊕···⊕P(fn)ª(fn;¹),
where P = P(f1)f1 ⊕ ··· ⊕ P(fn)fn. Now, his axiom can be sated as follows:
24Seo (2009) assumes that the set of states is ﬁnite.
29Axiom (Dominance, Seo (2009)): For all P;Q ∈ ∆(F),
ª(P;¹)   ª(Q;¹) for all ¹ ∈ ∆(S) ⇒ P   Q:
Seo (2009, p. 1587, Lemma 5.1) shows that under Dominance, Reduction of Compound
Lotteries and Reversal of Order are equivalent. This observation together with Corollary 4
imply the following result:
Corollary 5: Under Reduction of Compound Lotteries, Dominance implies Indiﬀerence.
Therefore, under Reduction of Compound Lotteries, Dominance together with the axioms
used in Theorem 1 and 2 (except Indiﬀerence) respectively imply EAP Maxmin and EAP
Piecewise–linear preferences, with ± = 0.
Appendix: Proofs
Section A provides a sketch of the proofs of suﬃciency for Theorems 1 and 2. Section B
provides proofs for Lemmas. The proofs of Theorem 1 and related results are in Section C,
while Section D presents the proofs of Theorem 2 and related results.
A Sketch of Proofs
By the standard argument, there exists a function V representing   on ∆(F). Ex–ante/Ex–
post Certainty Independence and Indiﬀerence will show that V can be taken so that the
restriction U of V on F has a Maxmin representation. That is, there exists a set C of priors
and a mixture linear function u on ∆(Z) such that U(f) = min¹∈C
∫
S u(fs)d¹(s).































2     P ∈ ∆(F)
}
: (8)
We now can show that C consists of the upper boundary of D as in Figure 6. In addition, if
(x;y) ∈ D, (c;c) ∈ C, and ® ∈ [0;1], then ®(x;y) + (1 − ®)(c;c) ∈ D.
Deﬁne a binary relation ˆ   on D : for all (x;y);(x′;y′) ∈ D,
(x;y) ˆ   (x
′;y
′) ⇔ V (P) ≥ V (Q);









will show that ˆ   is a well–deﬁned binary relation. The purpose of the proof is to show that
there exists a real number ± such that for any (x;y) and (x′;y′) ∈ D, (x;y) ˆ   (x′;y′) ⇔
±x + (1 − ±)y ≥ ±x′ + (1 − ±)y′. Together with the deﬁnition of ˆ  , this implies that
V (P) ≥ V (Q) ⇔ ±U((Ps)s) + (1 − ±)U(lP) ≥ ±U((Qs)s) + (1 − ±)U(lQ):
Since V is unique up to positive aﬃne transformation and both V and U coincide with u
on ∆(Z), then V (P) = ±U((Ps)s) + (1 − ±)U(lP) for all P, as desired.
In the following, we sketch how to show the existence of the desired real number ±.25 It
will be shown that ˆ   satisﬁes completeness, transitivity, monotonicity on C, and certainty
independence:
(x;y) ˆ   (x
′;y
′) ⇔ ®(x;y) + (1 − ®)(c;c) ˆ   ®(x
′;y
′) + (1 − ®)(c;c): (9)
If the set C of priors is degenerate, the existence of the ± is trivial.26 So, suppose that
C is nondegenerate. Then, there exist f∗;g∗ ∈ F such that 1
2f∗ + 1
2g∗ ≻ f∗. Let (x∗;y∗) =
25Note that, the continuity of ˆ   does not follow directly from the continuity of  . In addition, in R2, it
is well–known that in general, additive linear representation requires more than Independence. (See Debrue
(1960).) So, the standard argument might not show the existence of the desired ± directly.














Figure 6: Indiﬀerence Curves of ˆ   .
(³;´)(1
2f∗ ⊕ 1
2g∗) ∈ D. Then x∗ > y∗. Now, consider the case where 1
2f∗ + (1 − ®)g∗  
1
2f∗⊕(1−®)g∗.27 This implies that (x∗;x∗) ˆ   (x∗;y∗). Without loss of generality, assume there
exists c > x∗ such that (c;c) ∈ D. Then, it follows from the monotonicity that (c;c) ˆ ≻ (x∗;x∗).
Hence, Continuity of   will show the existence of ® such that (x∗;x∗) ˆ ∼ ®(x∗;y∗)+(1−®)(c;c).
Deﬁne (ˆ x; ˆ y) = (®x∗ + (1 − ®)c;®y∗(1 − ®)c). Then, let T be a triangle, including the
interior, which consists of the vertices (c;c), (x∗;x∗), and (ˆ x; ˆ y). It follows that T ⊂ D and
T is not degenerate. Certainty Independence of ˆ   and the Carath´ eodory’s Theorem show
that the indiﬀerence curves on T are parallel, as shown in Figure 6. Since (x∗;x∗) ˆ ∼ (ˆ x; ˆ y),
the ± is determined to be 1 − (ˆ x − x∗)=(ˆ x − ˆ y). Finally, given that C consists of the upper
boundary of both D and T , certainty independence of ˆ   again will show that the indiﬀerence
curves are expanded over the whole domain D. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
In Theorem 2, the suﬃciency of axioms is shown in an analogous way. First, we show
that   restricted on F has Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) piecewise–linear utility representation.
This step requires Unboundedness. Given the representation on F, the rest of the proof is
the same as the proof of Theorem 1.
27In the other case where 1
2f¤ ⊕(1−®)g¤ 1
2f¤ +(1−®)g¤, analogous argument holds. See footnote 30 for
details.
32B Proof of Lemmas
Several notations are introduced as follows: ˆ ∑
is a summation by ex–ante mixtures and
∑
is a summation by ex–post mixtures. That is, for any set {fi}n




i=1 ®i = 1, deﬁne ˆ ∑
®ifi ≡ ®1f1 ⊕ ··· ⊕ ®nfn and
∑
®ifi ≡ ®1f1 + ··· + ®nfn.
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
To see that Reversal of Order implies State–wise Indiﬀerence, ﬁx P;Q ∈ ∆(F) such that
(Ps)s ∼ (Qs)s. Then, there exist sets {fi} and {gj} of acts and sets of nonnegative numbers
{®i} and {¯j} such that
∑
i ®i = 1 =
∑
j=1 ¯j, P = ˆ ∑
i®ifi, and Q = ˆ ∑
j¯jgj. Then,
Reversal of Order shows P ∼
∑
i ®ifi = (Ps)s ∼ (Qs)s =
∑
j ¯jgj ∼ Q.
To see that State–wise Indiﬀerence implies Reversal of Order, ﬁx f;g ∈ F and ® ∈ [0;1].
Let P = ®f +(1−®)g and Q = ®f ⊕(1−®)g. Then for all s ∈ S, Ps = ®fs+(1−®)gs = Qs,
so that (Ps)s ∼ (Qs)s. Then, State–wise Indiﬀerence shows P ∼ Q.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2
To see that Indiﬀerence implies Reduction of Compound Lotteries, ﬁx l;r ∈ ∆(Z) and ® ∈
[0;1]. Let P = ®l+(1−®)r and Q = ®l⊕(1−®)r. Then, Ps = ®l+(1−®)r = Qs for all s ∈ S,
so that (Ps)s = (Qs)s, so that condition (i) is satisﬁed. In addition, lP = ®l + (1 − ®)r = lQ,
so that condition (ii) is also satisﬁed. Hence, Indiﬀerence implies P ∼ Q.
C Proof of Theorem 1
The necessity of axioms is easy to check. To show Continuity, note that the set of ﬁnitely
additive probabilities measures is compact under the product topology. So, the closed subset
C of the set of ﬁnitely additive probabilities is compact. Hence, the Berge’s Theorem can be
applied.
33In the following, we will prove the suﬃciency. Suppose that a preference relation  
on ∆(F) satisﬁes the axioms in Theorem 1. Then, by Lemma 2,   satisﬁes Reduction of
Compound Lotteries as well.
The ﬁrst step shows Reversal of Order between generic acts and constant acts, which will
be used in the next step.
Step 1: For all ® ∈ [0;1], f ∈ F, and l ∈ ∆(Z), ®f ⊕ (1 − ®)l ∼ ®f + (1 − ®)l.
Proof of Step 1: Fix ® ∈ [0;1], f ∈ F, and l ∈ ∆(Z). Let P = ®f ⊕ (1 − ®)l
to show P ∼ ®f + (1 − ®)l. Then by Reduction of Compound Lotteries, for all s ∈ S,
Ps = ®fs ⊕ (1 − ®)l ∼ ®fs + (1 − ®)l. So, by Monotonicity, (Ps)s ∼ ®f + (1 − ®)l, so that
the condition (i) in Indiﬀerence is satisﬁed. In addition, since lf ∼ f, Ex–post Certainty
Independence shows lP = ®lf + (1 − ®)l ∼ ®f + (1 − ®)l, so that the condition (ii) in
Indiﬀerence is satisﬁed as well. Hence, Indiﬀerence shows P ∼ ®f + (1 − ®)l.  
Step 2: There exists a function V : ∆(F) → R such that
(i) V represents   on ∆(F),
(ii) for all ® ∈ [0;1], P ∈ ∆(F), and l ∈ ∆(Z), V (®P ⊕ (1 − ®)l) = ®V (P) + (1 − ®)V (l),
(iii) V is unique up to positive aﬃne transformation.
(iv) Let U be the restriction of V on F. There exists a nonempty convex closed set C of
ﬁnitely additive probability measures on Σ, and a mixture linear function u : ∆(Z) → R such
that U(f) = min¹∈C
∫
S u(fs)d¹(s).
Proof of Step 2: From the implication of the von Neumann–Morgenstern’s Theorem,
there exists a mixture linear function u : ∆(Z) → R representing   restricted to ∆(Z). In
addition, u is unique up to positive aﬃne transformation. So, choose u such that u(z+) = 1
and u(z−) = −1.
For an arbitrary P ∈ ∆(F), deﬁne
MP = {®P ⊕ (1 − ®)l|l ∈ ∆(Z) and ® ∈ [0;1]}:
Thus, MP is the set of ex–ante mixtures of P and the constant acts. Using the von Neumann–
Morgenstern’s Theorem again, there is a function VP : MP → R representing   restricted to
34MP, which is linear with respect to the ex–ante mixtures. In addition, again, VP is unique up
to positive aﬃne transformation. So, choose VP such that VP(z+) = 1 and VP(z−) = −1.
For all l;r ∈ ∆(Z) VP(l) ≥ VP(r) ⇔ l   r ⇔ u(l) ≥ u(r). Hence, there exists an
increasing function v : u(∆(Z)) → R such that VP(l) = v(u(l)) for all l ∈ ∆(Z). Moreover,
since Vp and u are mixture linear, it follows from Reduction of Compound Lotteries that v is
also mixture linear.28 In addition, by the normalization, v(1) = 1 and v(−1) = −1. Hence,
we can conclude that v is the identity function, so that VP(l) = u(l).
Now, we deﬁne a real valued function V on ∆(F) which represents   by V (P) = VP(P) for
all P ∈ ∆(F). Note that V is well–deﬁned, because if R ∈ MP ∩ MQ, then VP(R) = VQ(R).
In addition, V (®P ⊕ (1 − ®)l) = ®V (P) + (1 − ®)V (l) for all ® ∈ [0;1], P ∈ ∆(F), and
l ∈ ∆(Z). Hence, parts (i), (ii), and (iii) hold.
Finally, to show (iv), let U be the restriction of V on F. Fix ® ∈ [0;1], f ∈ F, and
l ∈ ∆(Z). Then by Step 1, ®f + (1 − ®)l ∼ ®f ⊕ (1 − ®)l. Hence, U(®f + (1 − ®)l) =
V (®f ⊕(1−®)l) = ®V (f)+(1−®)V (l) = ®U(f)+(1−®)U(l), where the second equality is
by Step 2 (ii). Hence, by Ex–post Ambiguity Aversion and Continuity (ii), part (iv) follows
from Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).  
Step 3: If C is degenerate then there exists a real number ± such that for all P ∈ ∆(F),
V (P) = ±U((Ps)s) + (1 − ±)
∫
F U(f)dP(f).









S u(fs)d¹∗(s)dP(f) = U(lP), where the second
equality holds by the Fubini’s Theorem. Therefore, (Ps)s ∼ lP. Hence, Indiﬀerence shows that
for all P ∈ ∆(F), P ∼ (Ps)s ∼ lP. Therefore, by Step 2, V (P) = U((Ps)s) =
∫
F U(f)dP(f).
So, the result holds.  
Henceforth, consider the case where C is nondegenerate. First, to make notations simple,





; ´(P) = U(lP):
28Choose a;b ∈ u(∆(Z)) and ® ∈ [0;1] to show v(®a+(1−®)b) = ®v(a)+(1−®)v(b). There exist l;r such
that u(l) = a and u(r) = b. Then by Reduction of Compound Lotteries, v(®a+(1−®)b) = v(u(®l+(1−®)r)) =
VP(®l + (1 − ®)r) = VP(®l ⊕ (1 − ®)r) = ®VP(l) + (1 − ®)VP(r) = ®v(a) + (1 − ®)v(b).
35The next step shows the property of the functions ³ and ´ as follows:
Step 4:
(i) For all ® ∈ [0;1], P ∈ ∆(F), and l ∈ ∆(Z), ³(®P ⊕ (1 − ®)l) = ®³(P) + (1 − ®)³(l) and
´(®P ⊕ (1 − ®)l) = ®´(P) + (1 − ®)´(l).
(ii) For all l ∈ ∆(Z), ³(l) = u(l) = ´(l).
(iii) For all P ∈ ∆(F), ³(P) ≥ ´(P).
Proof of Step 4: Parts (i) and (ii) follow from Step 2 (iv). To show (iii), for all x ∈ RS
deﬁne F : RS → R by F(x) = min¹∈C
∫
S xs¹(s). Then F is concave. Therefore, for all
P ∈ ∆(F), Jensen’s Inequality (Hiriart–Urruty and Lemar´ echal (1949, p. 76, Theorem














dP(f) = ´(P).  
Subsets C and D of R2 are deﬁned by (8) in Section A. The next step shows that C and
D are as in Figure 6 in Section A as follows:
Step 5:
(i) C ⊂ @D, where @D is the boundary of D.
(ii) For all (x;y) ∈ D, (c;c) ∈ C, and ® ∈ [0;1], ®(x;y) + (1 − ®)(c;c) ∈ D.
Proof of Step 5: By Step 4 (iii), for all (x;y) ∈ D, x ≥ y. Hence, C ⊂ @D. Now
we will show (ii). Choose any (x;y) ∈ D, (c;c) ∈ C, and ® ∈ [0;1]. Then, there exist
P ∈ ∆(F) and l ∈ ∆(Z) such that (x;y) = (³(P);´(P))and ³(l) = c = ´(l). Hence, by Step
4 (i), ³(®P ⊕ (1 − ®)±l) = ®³(P) + (1 − ®)³(l) = ®x + (1 − ®)c and ´(®P ⊕ (1 − ®)±l) =
®´(P) + (1 − ®)³(l) = ®y + (1 − ®)c. Therefore, ®(x;y) + (1 − ®)(c;c) ∈ D.  
To deﬁne a binary relation ˆ   on D, ﬁrst deﬁne v : D → R by for all (x;y) ∈ D,
v(x;y) = V (P);
where P ∈ ∆(F) and ³(P) = x and ´(P) = y.
Step 6: v is well-deﬁned, i.e., if v(x;y) ̸= v(x′;y′), then (x;y) ̸= (x′;y′).
Proof of Step 6: Choose any (x;y);(x′;y′) ∈ D such that v(x;y) ̸= v(x′;y′). Assume
to the contrary that (x;y) = (x′;y′). Then, by deﬁnition, there exist P;Q ∈ ∆(F) such
36that (³(P);´(P)) = (x;y) and (³(Q);´(Q)) = (x′;y′). Hence, (³(P);´(P)) = (³(Q);´(Q)).
Hence, U((Ps)s) = ³(P) = ³(Q) = U((Qs)s), so that the condition (i) in Indiﬀerence is
satisﬁed. In addition, U(lP) =
∫
F U(f)dP(f) = ´(P) = ´(Q) =
∫
F U(f)dQ(f) = U(lQ),
so that the condition (ii) in Indiﬀerence is satisﬁed as well. Therefore, Indiﬀerence shows
v(x;y) = V (P) = V (Q) = v(x′;y′), which is a contradiction. Hence, (x;y) ̸= (x′;y′).  
Now, deﬁne a binary relation ˆ   on D by for all (x;y);(x′;y′) ∈ D,
(x;y) ˆ   (x
′;y
′) ⇔ v(x;y) ≥ v(x
′;y
′):
The next step shows the property of ˆ   as follows:
Step 7: ˆ   satisﬁes completeness, transitivity, monotonicity on C, and certainty independence
deﬁned by (9) in Section A.
Proof of Step 7: Since v is a well-deﬁned real valued function, the completeness and
transitivity are trivial. First, we will show the monotonicity on C. Choose any (c;c);(c′;c′) ∈
C. Then there exist l;l′ ∈ ∆(Z) such that u(l) = c and u(l′) = c′. Hence, (c;c) ˆ   (c′;c′) ⇔
v(u(l);u(l)) ≥ v(u(l′);u(l′)) ⇔ V (l) ≥ V (l′) ⇔ u(l) ≥ u(l′) ⇔ c ≥ c′.
Next, we will show the certainty independence. Choose any (x;y);(x′;y′);(c;c) ∈ D and
® ∈ [0;1]. By Step 5 (ii), ®(x;y) + (1 − ®)(c;c);®(x′;y′) + (1 − ®)(c;c) ∈ D. Then, there
exist P;Q ∈ ∆(F) and l ∈ ∆(Z) such that (x;y) = (³(P);´(P)), (x′;y′) = (³(Q);´(Q)), and
(c;c) = (³(l);´(l)). By Step 4 (i), ®(x;y)+(1−®)(c;c) = (³(®P ⊕(1−®)l);´(®P ⊕(1−®)l))
and ®(x′;y′) + (1 − ®)(c;c) = (³(®Q ⊕ (1 − ®)l);´(®Q ⊕ (1 − ®)l)). Therefore,









⇔ V (P) ≥ V (Q)
⇔ V (®P ⊕ (1 − ®)l) ≥ V (®Q ⊕ (1 − ®)l) (∵ Step 2 (ii))
⇔ v
(
³(®P ⊕ (1 − ®)l);´(®P ⊕ (1 − ®)l)) ≥ v(³(®Q ⊕ (1 − ®)l);´(®Q ⊕ (1 − ®)l
)
)
⇔ ®(x;y) + (1 − ®)(c;c) ˆ   ®(x′;y′) + (1 − ®)(c;c):  
37Because of the nondegeneracy of C, there exist f∗;g∗ ∈ F such that f∗ ∼ g∗, 1
2f∗+ 1
2g∗ ≻













2g∗) > U(f∗) = ´(1
2f∗ ⊕ 1
2g∗) = y∗. By Nondegeneracy of  , there exist c or c
such that c > x∗ or x∗ > c. By the mixture linearity of u, without loss of generality, assume
c > x∗ > c.
To deﬁne the set T as in Section A, the next step is proved.
Step 8:
(i) If (x∗;x∗) ˆ   (x∗;y∗), then there exist ® > 0 such that (x∗;x∗) ˆ ∼ ®(x∗;y∗) + (1 − ®)(c;c).
(ii) If (x∗;y∗) ˆ   (x∗;x∗), then there exist ® > 0 such that (x∗;x∗) ˆ ∼ ®(x∗;y∗) + (1 − ®)(c;c).
Proof of Step 8: We will show (i). By the monotonicity, (c;c) ˆ ≻ (x∗;x∗) ˆ   (x∗;y∗).
Then there exist l ∈ ∆(Z) such that u(l) = c and l   1
2f∗ + 1
2g∗   1
2f∗ ⊕ 1
2g∗. Then by




2g∗) ⊕ (1 − ®)l. Let
ˆ f = ®f∗ +(1−®)l and ˆ g = ®g∗ +(1−®)l. Then 1
2
ˆ f + 1
2ˆ g ≻ ˆ f ∼ ˆ g and 1
2
ˆ f ⊕ 1
2ˆ g ∼ 1
2f∗ + 1
2g∗.
Hence, ®(x∗;y∗) + (1 − ®)(c;c) = (³;´)(1
2
ˆ f ⊕ 1
2ˆ g)ˆ ∼(³;´)(1
2f∗ + 1
2g∗) = (x∗;x∗). Part (ii) is
proved in the same way.  








(x;y) ∈ R2 | x ≥ y;
⟨











where ⟨·;·⟩ is a inner product. The set T is a triangle including the interior which consists
of the vertices (c;c), (x∗;x∗), and (ˆ x; ˆ y) as shown in Figure 6 in Section A.
Step 9: T is nondegenerate and T ⊂ D .
29Otherwise, f ∼ g ⇒ 1
2f + 1
2g ∼ f for all f;g ∈ F. This implies the subjective expected utility, so C
become degenerate.
30In the other case where (x¤;y¤) (x¤;x¤), denote
(
®c+(1−®)x¤;®c+(1−®)y¤)
by (˜ x; ˜ y). Then, instead
of the triangle T deﬁned by (10), consider a triangle, including the interior, which consists of the vertices
(˜ c;˜ c), (c;c), and (x¤;x¤). Then, the rest of the proof goes through exactly in the same way.
38Proof of Step 9: Since x∗ > y∗ and, in addition, ® > 0, then ˆ x > ˆ y. Therefore, (x∗;x∗) ̸=
(ˆ x; ˆ y) ̸= (c;c). Hence, T is not degenerate. Choose any (x;y) ∈ T to show (x;y) ∈ D. Since
T is the triangle, the Carath´ eodory’s Theorem (Hiriart–Urruty and Lemar´ echal (1949, p. 29,
Theorem 1.3.6)) shows that there exist ®;¯ ∈ [0;1] such that (x;y) = ®(c;c) + ¯(x∗;x∗) +
(1−®−¯)(ˆ x; ˆ y). Now, let c = ®
®+¯c+ ®
®+¯x∗. Then, (x;y) = (®+¯)(c;c)+(1−®+¯)(ˆ x; ˆ y).
Therefore, since (ˆ x; ˆ y) ∈ D and (c;c) ∈ C, it follows from Step 5 (ii) that (x;y) ∈ D.  
The next step shows the existence of the desired real number ± on the restricted domain
T as follows:
Step 10: There exists a real number ± such that for any (x;y);(x′;y′) ∈ T , (x;y) ˆ   (x′;y′) ⇔
±x + (1 − ±)y ≥ ±x′ + (1 − ±)y′.
Proof of Step 10:
Substep 10.1: For all (x;y) ∈ T , there exists a unique number ® ∈ [0;1] such that (x;y) ∼
®(c;c) + (1 − ®)(x∗;x∗).
Proof of Substep 10.1: Choose any (x;y) ∈ T . Since T is the triangle, the Carath´ eodory’s
Theorem, again, shows that there exist ®;¯ ∈ [0;1] such that (x;y) = ®(c;c) + ¯(x∗;x∗) +
(1−®−¯)(ˆ x; ˆ y). Since (ˆ x; ˆ y)ˆ ∼ (x∗;x∗), the transitivity and the certainty independence shows
(x;y) ˆ ∼ ®(c;c) + (1 − ®)(x∗;x∗). Since c > x∗, the monotonicity of ˆ   on C shows that ® is
unique.
For all (x;y) ∈ T , deﬁne c(x;y) = ®c + (1 − ®)x∗, where ® is as in Substep 10.1.




ˆ x − x∗
ˆ x − ˆ y
.
Proof of Substep 10.2: Choose any (x;y) ∈ T . By the proof of Substep 10.1, there exist




x − ®c − (1 − ®)x∗
x − y
(∵ c(x;y) = ®c + (1 − ®)x∗)
=
ˆ x − x∗
ˆ x − ˆ y
: (∵ (x;y) = ®(c;c) + ¯(x∗;x∗) + (1 − ® − ¯)(ˆ x; ˆ y))
Deﬁne ± = 1 −
ˆ x − x∗
ˆ x − ˆ y
.
39Substep 10.3: For any (x;y);(x′;y′) ∈ T , (x;y) ˆ   (x′;y′) ⇔ ±x+(1−±)y ≥ ±x′ +(1−±)y′.
Proof of Substep 10.3: Choose any (x;y);(x′;y′) ∈ T . Then
(x;y) ˆ   (x′;y′) ⇔ (c(x;y);c(x;y)) ˆ   (c(x′;y′);c(x′;y′)) (∵ Substep 10.1)
⇔ c(x;y) ≥ c(x′;y′) (∵ Step 7)
⇔ ±x + (1 − ±)y ≥ ±x′ + (1 − ±)y′: (∵ Substep 10.2)  
The next step shows the existence of the desired ± on D as follows:
Step 11: For all (x;y);(x′;y′) ∈ D, (x;y) ˆ   (x′;y′) ⇔ ±x + (1 − ±)y ≥ ±x′ + (1 − ±)y′.
Proof of Step 11: Choose any (x;y);(x′;y′) ∈ D. Let c∗ = 1
2c + 1
2x∗. Since T is a
nondegenerate triangle, there exists a positive number " such that {(x;y) ∈ D|∥(x;y) −
(c∗;c∗)∥ < "} ⊂ T . Hence, there exists ® ∈ (0;1] such that ®(x;y) + (1 − ®)(c∗;c∗) and
®(x′;y′) + (1 − ®)(c∗;c∗) belong to {(x;y) ∈ D′′|∥(x;y) − (c∗;c∗)∥ < "} ⊂ T . Therefore,
(x;y) ˆ   (x′;y′) ⇔ ®(x;y) + (1 − ®)(c∗;c∗) ˆ   ®(x′;y′) + (1 − ®)(c∗;c∗) (∵ Step 7)
⇔ ±(®x + (1 − ®)c∗) + (1 − ±)(®y + (1 − ®)c∗) (∵ Step 10)
≥ ±(®x′ + (1 − ®)c∗) + (1 − ±)(®y′ + (1 − ®)c∗)
⇔ ±x + (1 − ±)y ≥ ±x′ + (1 − ±)y′:  
Step 12: For all P;Q ∈ ∆(F), P   Q ⇔ ±³(P) + (1 − ±)´(P) ≥ ±³(Q) + (1 − ±)´(Q).
Proof of Step 12: For all P;Q ∈ ∆(F), P   Q ⇔ V (P) ≥ V (Q) ⇔ v(³(P);´(P)) ≥
v(³(Q);´(Q)) ⇔ (³(P);´(P)) ˆ   (³(Q);´(Q)) ⇔ ±³(P)+(1−±)´(P) ≥ ±³(Q)+(1−±)´(Q),
where the last equivalence is by Step 11.  
Step 12 shows that ±³ + (1 − ±)´ represents   on ∆(F). Also by Step 4 (ii), V =
u = ±³ + (1 − ±)´ on ∆(Z). Since V is unique up to positive aﬃne transformation, Hence,
V = ±³ + (1 − ±)´. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
40C.1 Proof of Corollary 1
It is easy to see that (ii) implies (i). So, we will show that (i) implies (ii). Fix   on ∆(F). Let
(±;C;u) and (±′;C′;u′) represent   as in Theorem 1, then u and u′ are aﬃne representations
of   restricted on ∆(Z). Hence, by the standard uniqueness results, there exist ® > 0 and
¯ ∈ R such that u = ®u′ + ¯. The uniqueness of C follows from Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989). So, C = C′.
To show ± = ±′, let V and V ′ be as in Theorem 1 deﬁned by (±;C;u) and (±′;C′;u′),
respectively. Let U and U′ be the restriction of V and V ′ on F, respectively. Since C is
nondegenerate, there exist f∗;g∗ ∈ F such that 1
2f∗ + 1





2g∗. By Step 8 in the proof of Theorem 1, there exist ˆ f; ˆ g ∈ F
such that 1
2
ˆ f + 1
2ˆ g ≻ ˆ f ∼ ˆ g and 1
2
ˆ f ⊕ 1




ˆ f + 1





ˆ f + 1














2ˆ g)−U′( ˆ f) = ±′,





2g∗. The proof is the same as Case 1.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose   is EAP Maxmin preference represented by V as in Theorem 1 with nondegenerate
C. Let U be the restriction of V on F. Choose ® ∈ [0;1] and f;g ∈ F. Then V (®f ⊕ (1 −
®)g) = ±U(®f +(1−®)g)+(1−±)(®U(f)+(1−®)U(g)) and U(®f +(1−®)g) ≥ ®U(f)+




To show (i), assume f ∼ g. Then, V (®f ⊕ (1 − ®)g) ≥ U(f) ⇔ ±U(®f + (1 − ®)g) ≥
±U(f) ⇔ ± ≥ 0. Hence,   satisﬁes Ex–ante Ambiguity Aversion if and only if ± ≥ 0. Part
(ii) is proved as follows: U(®f +(1−®)g) ≥ V (®f ⊕(1−®)g) ⇔ (1−±)U(®f +(1−®)g) ≥
(1−±)(®U(f)+(1−®)U(g)) ⇔ ± ≤ 1. Hence,   satisﬁes Interim Ambiguity Aversion if and
only if ± ≤ 1.
41C.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Fix two EAP Maxmin preferences { i}i=1;2. Let (±i;Ci;ui) represent  i as in Theorem 1.
Suppose Ci is nondegenerate. Let Vi be as in Theorem 1 deﬁned by (±i;Ci;ui). Let Ui be the
restriction of Vi on F.
First, we will prove that (i) implies (ii). Suppose  1 is more Ex–ante Ambiguity Averse
than  2. Then, there exist ® > 0 and ¯ such that u1 = ®u2+¯. A straightforward argument






2g∗. By Step 8 in the proof of Theorem 1, there exist ˆ f; ˆ g ∈ F
such that 1
2
ˆ f + 1
2ˆ g ≻i ˆ f ∼i ˆ g and 1
2




2g∗. Since  1 is more ex–ante ambiguity
averse than  2, 1
2
ˆ f ⊕ 1





ˆ f + 1
2ˆ g) > Ui( ˆ f) = Ui(ˆ g), Vi(1
2




ˆ f + 1
2ˆ g)+(1−±i)Ui( ˆ f), V2(1
2
ˆ f ⊕ 1




ˆ f ⊕ 1

















2ˆ g)−U2( ˆ f) = ±2, where the second equality holds
because U1 = ®U2 + ¯.
Case 2: 1
2f∗ + (1 − 1
2)g∗ 2
1
2f∗ ⊕ (1 − 1
2)g∗. The proof is the same as Case 1.
Next, we will prove that (ii) implies (i). Suppose ±1 ≥ ±2, C1 = C2, and there exist ® > 0,
¯ ∈ R such that u1 = ®u2 + ¯. Then, U1 = ®U2 + ¯. Fix any P ∈ ∆(F) and f ∈ F such
that P  2 f to show P  1 f.
Case 1: U1((Ps)s) =
∫
F U1(g)dP(g). Then V1(P) = U1((Ps)s) ≥ U1(f). Since U1 = ®U2 +¯,
V2(P) = U2((Ps)s) ≥ U2(f), as desired.
Case 2: U1((Ps)s) ̸=
∫
F U1(g)dP(g). Since U1 = ®U2 +¯, U2((Ps)s) ̸=
∫
F U2(g)dP(g). Since












F U1(g)dP(g), where the last equality
holds because U1 = ®U2 + ¯. So, V1(P) = ±1U1((Ps)s) + (1 − ±1)
∫
F U1(g)dP(g) ≥ U1(f), as
desired.  
31By a normalization, u1 = u2. Let, l0 = 1
2±z+ + 1
2±z¡. Suppose to the contrary that U1 ̸= U2. Without
loss of generality assume that there exists f ∈ F such that U1(f) > U2(f) and 1 ≥ U2(f) ≥ −1. Then
z+  2 f  2 z¡. Since  1 is more Ex–ante Ambiguity Averse than  2, z+  1 f  1 z¡. Fix a positive number
" such that " < U1(f)−U2(f). Deﬁne l = (U2(f)+")±x+ +(1−U2(f)−")l0. Then Ui(l) = U2(f)+" < U1(f).
Therefore, l ≻2 f but f ≻1 l. This is a contradiction. Hence, U1 = U2, so that C1 = C2.
42C.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose   is EAP Maxmin preference represented by V as in Theorem 1. Let U be the
restriction of V on F. It is easy to see that (ii) holds. So, we will show (i). To show (a),
suppose ± > 0. It is easy to see that Ex–post Ambiguity Aversion implies Ex–ante Ambiguity
Aversion. To see the opposite direction, suppose that   satisﬁes Ex–ante Ambiguity Aversion.
Fix ® ∈ [0;1] and f;g ∈ F such that f ∼ g to show ®f+(1−®)g   f. Since ®f⊕(1−®)g f,
then U(f) ≤ V (®f ⊕ (1 − ®)g) = ±U(®f + (1 − ®)g) + (1 − ±)U(f), so that ±U(f) ≤
±U(®f + (1 − ®)g). Since ± > 0, then U(®f + (1 − ®)g) ≥ U(f). Part (b) is proved in the
same way. It is easy to see that (c) holds.
D Proof of Theorem 2
The necessity of axioms is easy to check. To show Continuity, note that EAP Piecewise–linear
preference is a weighted sum of max functions and a mixture linear function u.
In the following, we will prove the suﬃciency. Suppose that a preference relation  
on ∆(F) satisﬁes the axioms in Theorem 2. Then, by Lemma 2,   satisﬁes Reduction of
Compound Lotteries as well.
As noted in the sketch in Section A, after proving that   restricted on F has the Fehr
and Schmidt’s (1999) piecewise linear utility representation, the rest of the proof is the same
as the proof of Theorem 1.
The ﬁrst step shows Reversal of Order among pointwise comonotonic acts; remember
ˆ ∑
denotes a summation by ex–ante mixtures, while
∑
denotes a summation by ex–post
mixtures.
Step 1: For any set {fi}n
i=1 of acts and any set of nonnegative numbers {®i}n
i=1 such that
∑n
i=1 ®i = 1, if any pair of acts among {fi}n




Proof of Step 1: By Induction on n. For n = 1, the statement is trivial.
First, we will prove the statement for n = 2. Fix ® ∈ [0;1] and f1;f2 ∈ F. Let
43P = ®f1 ⊕ (1 − ®)f2 to show P ∼ ®f1 + (1 − ®)f2. Then by Reduction of Compound
Lotteries, Ps = ®f1
s ⊕ (1 − ®)f2
s ∼ ®f1
s + (1 − ®)f2
s for all s ∈ S. So, by Substitution,
(Ps)s ∼ ®f1+(1−®)f2, so that the condition (i) in Indiﬀerence is satisﬁed. In addition, since
f1 and f2 are pointwise comonotonic, Ex–post Pointwise Comonotonic Independence shows
lP = ®lf1 +(1−®)lf2 ∼ ®f1 +(1−®)f2, so that the condition (ii) in Indiﬀerence is satisﬁed
as well. Hence, Indiﬀerence shows P ∼ ®f1 + (1 − ®)f2.
Let P ≡ ˆ ∑n−1
i=1
®i




1−®nfi. Suppose the statement is true for n − 1.
Then P ∼ g. Now, we will show the statement for n. Since any pair of acts among {fi}n
i=1 are
pointwise comonotonic, any pair among (Ps)s;g, and fn are pointwise comonotonic. There-
fore, ˆ ∑n
i=1®ifi ≡ (1 − ®n)P ⊕ ®nfn ∼ (1 − ®n)g ⊕ ®nfn ∼ (1 − ®n)g + ®nfn ≡
∑n
i=1 ®ifi,
where the second equivalence is by Ex–ante Pointwise Comonotonic Independence and the
third equivalence is by the statement for n = 2.  
Step 2: There exists a function V : ∆(F) → R such that
(i) V represents   on ∆(F),
(ii) for all ® ∈ [0;1] and P;Q ∈ ∆(F) such that (Ps)s and (Qs)s are pointwise comonotonic,
V (®P + (1 − ®)Q) = ®V (P) + (1 − ®)V (Q),
(iii) V is unique up to positive aﬃne transformation.
(iv) Let u be the restriction of V on ∆(Z). Then u : ∆(Z) → R is mixture linear onto
function such that u(z+) = 1, u(z−) = −1, and u(l0) = 0.
Proof of Step 2: In the same way as Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 1, there exist a real
valued function V on ∆(F) satisfying (i) and (iii) and a mixture linear function u on ∆(Z). In
addition, for all ® ∈ [0;1], P ∈ ∆(F), and l ∈ ∆(Z), V (®P ⊕(1−®)l) = ®V (P)+(1−®)V (l)
and V (l) = u(l).
Lemma 69 of Cerreia–Vioglio et al. (2008) shows that   satisﬁes Unboundedness if and
only if u is onto function. Normalize u by u(z+) = 1 and u(z−) = −1. So, part (iv) holds.
Finally to show (ii), choose any P;Q ∈ ∆(F) such that (Ps)s and (Qs)s are pointwise
comonotonic. Since u is onto, there exists l ∈ ∆(Z) such that l ∼ P. Hence, Ex–ante
Pointwise Comonotonic Independence shows ®l⊕(1−®)Q ∼ ®P ⊕(1−®)Q. Hence, V (®P ⊕
(1 − ®)Q)= V (®l ⊕ (1 − ®)Q)= ®V (l) + (1 − ®)V (Q) = ®V (P) + (1 − ®)V (Q):  
44Step 3: For all f ∈ F, there exists an act ˜ f ∈ F such that 1
2f1 + 1
2
˜ fs ∼ 1
2fs + 1
2l0 for all
s ∈ S, and 1
2f1 + 1
2
˜ f ∼ 1
2f + 1
2l0.
Proof of Step 3: Choose any f ∈ F and s ∈ S. Since u is onto, there exists an element
ls ∈ ∆(Z) such that u(ls) = u(fs) − u(f1). Deﬁne an act ˜ f ∈ F by ˜ f(s) = ls for all
s ∈ S. Then by deﬁnition, 1
2f1 + 1
2
˜ fs ∼ 1
2fs + 1




˜ f ∼ 1
2f + 1
2l0.  
Let U be the restriction of V on F. For all s ̸= 1, deﬁne
®s = −U((z+;(l0)−s)); ¯s = −U((z−;(l0)−s)):
Step 4: {®s;¯s}s∈S\{1} are nonnegative numbers such that for all f ∈ F,




®s max{u(fs) − u(f1);0} + ¯s max{u(f1) − u(fs);0}
)
:
Proof of Step 4: By Ex–post Inequality Aversion, ®s;¯s ≥ 0 for all s ̸= 1. Fix f ∈ F
and let ˜ f as in Step 3.
Substep 4.1: For all (ls)s̸=1 ⊂ ∆(Z), any pair in {(ls;(l0)−s)}s̸=1 are pointwise comonotonic.




|S| l0 ∼ 1








|S| l0 ∼ 1
|S|f +
|S|−1
|S| l0. By Substep 4.1, any pair among {( ˜ fs;(l0)−s)}s̸=1 are
pointwise comonotonic. Since f1 ∈ ∆(Z) is also pointwise comonotonic with any acts, Step 1
again shows 1
|S|f1 ⊕ ˆ ∑
s̸=1
1






Now, let g ≡ 1
|S|f +
|S|−1





|S|( ˜ fs;(l0)−s) to show gs ∼ hs for all






























˜ fs by Step 3. Then
Substitution shows g ∼ h. Hence, 1
|S|f ⊕
|S|−1
|S| l0 ∼ 1




Substep 4.3: Let S = {s ∈ S|fs ≻ f1} and S = {s ∈ S|f1 ≻ fs}.
45(i) for all s ∈ S, V (( ˜ fs;(l0)−s)) = −®s max{u(fs) − u(f1);0},
(ii) for all s ∈ S, V (( ˜ fs;(l0)−s)) = −¯s max{u(f1) − u(fs);0},
(iii) for all s ∈ S \ (S ∪ S), V (( ˜ fs;(l0)−s)) = 0.
Proof of Substep 4.3: We will show (i). Fix s ∈ S. Then fs ≻ f1. So, ˜ fs ≻ l0. Hence, by
Continuity (ii), there exists n ∈ Z+ such that z+ ≻ 1
n
˜ fs + n−1
n l0 ≻ l0. By Step 2 (ii) and the








nu( ˜ fs) > 0. Hence, 1
n












l0. Hence, by Substitution, 1












Therefore, by Step 2 (ii), again, V (( ˜ fs;(l0)−s)) = n( 1
nu( ˜ fs)V ((z+;(l0)−s))) = −®su( ˜ fs) =
−®s max{u(fs)−u(f1);0}. Part (ii) is proved in the same way. Finally, we will show (iii). For
all s ∈ S\(S∪S), ˜ fs ∼ l0, Hence, by Substitution, ( ˜ fs;(l0)−s) ∼ l0. Hence, V (( ˜ fs;(l0)−s)) = 0.
By Substep 4.1–4.3, therefore,
U(f) = |S|V ( 1
|S|f ⊕
|S|−1
|S| l0) (∵ Step 2 (ii))
= |S|V ( 1
|S|f1 ⊕ ˆ ∑
s̸=1
1
|S|( ˜ fs;(l0)−s)) (∵ Substep 4.2)
= V (f1) +
∑









If (®;¯) = 0, then the theorem holds trivially. So, henceforth, we consider the case where





; ´(P) = U(lP):
Then by Step 4, for all P ∈ ∆(F),















®s max{u(fs) − u(f1);0} + ¯s max{u(f1) − u(fs);0}
))
dP(f):
The next step shows the functions ³ and ´ have the same property as in Theorem 1.
Step 5:
46(i) For all ® ∈ [0;1], P ∈ ∆(F), and l ∈ ∆(Z), ³(®P ⊕ (1 − ®)l) = ®³(P) + (1 − ®)³(l) and
´(®P ⊕ (1 − ®)l) = ®´(P) + (1 − ®)´(l).
(ii) For all l ∈ ∆(Z), ³(l) = u(l) = ´(l).
(iii) For all P ∈ ∆(F), ³(P) ≥ ´(P).
Proof of Step 5: Parts (i) and (ii) hold in the same way as Step 4 in the proof of Theorem
1. To show (iii), ﬁx P ∈ ∆(F). Fix s ̸= 1. For all x ∈ RS, deﬁne Gs : RS → R by
Gs(x) = −®s max{xs − x1;0} − ¯s max{x1 − xs;0}, where xt is the t–th element of x. Then
Gs is concave.32 For all x ∈ RS, deﬁne F : RS → R by F(x) = x1 +
∑
s̸=1 Gs(x). Since F is a
sum of concave functions, F is also concave. Therefore, for all P ∈ ∆(F), Jensen’s Inequality














dP(f) = ´(P).  
Note that Ex–ante/Ex–post Pointwise Comonotonic Independence implies Ex–ante/Ex–
post Certainty Independence. Given Step 5 above, the same argument as Step 5–12 in the
proof of Theorem 1 shows the existence of the desired real number ±.
Finally, the next step shows the uniqueness property of the representation.
Step 6: The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) Two triples (±;®;¯;u) and (±′;®′;¯′;u′) represent the same preference   as in Theorem 2.
(ii) (a) (®;¯) = (®′;¯′) and there exist a > 0;b ∈ R such that u = au′ + b; and
(b) If (®;¯) ̸= 0 then ± = ±′.
Proof of Step 6: It is easy to see that (ii) implies (i). So, we will show that (i) implies
(ii). Choose any two triples (±;®;¯;u) and (±′;®′;¯′;u′) represent the same preference   as
in Theorem 2. We will show (a). Given (a), part (b) is proved in the same way as Corollary
1. (®;¯;u) and (®′;¯′;u′) represent the same preference   restricted to F as in Step 4. Then
u and u′ are aﬃne representation of the restriction of   on ∆(Z). Hence, by the standard
uniqueness results, there exist a > 0;b ∈ R such that u = au′+b. Suppose to the contrary that
(®;¯) ̸= (®′;¯′). Then, there exists at least one element s ̸= 1 such that ®s ̸= ®′
s or ¯s ̸= ¯′
s.
Without loss of generality, assume ®s > ®′
s. Let V and V ′ have the representations on F as
in Step 4 deﬁned by (®;¯;u) and (®′;¯′;u′), respectively. Take n large enough to hold ®s
n < 1.
32If f : RS → R is convex, then max{f(·);0} is also convex. If f;g : RS → R are convex and a;b are
nonnegative numbers, then af + bg is also convex.
47Then, V ( 1
n(z+;(l0)−s) + n−1




n z− + (1 − ®s
n )l0
)
and V ′( 1
n(z+;(l0)−s) + n−1
n l0)











n l0 ∼ ®s




n z− + (1 −
®′
s
n )l0 ∼ 1
n(z+;(l0)−s) + n−1
n l0, where the second strict relation is by ®s > ®′
s and
l0 ≻ z−. This is a contradiction. Hence, (®;¯) = (®′;¯′).  
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
D.1 Proof of Corollary 2
Suppose   is EAP Piecewise–linear preference represented by V as in Theorem 2. Since
(®;¯) ̸= 0. Without loss of generality, assume ®s > 0 for some s ̸= 1.
First, we will show (i). Choose any l+;l− ∈ ∆(Z) such that l+ ≻ l0 ≻ l− and (l+;(l0)−s) ∼
(l−;(l0)−s). Then, U(l+;(l0)−s) = −®su(l+) and U(l−;(l0)−s) = ¯su(l−). Since (l+;(l0)−s) ∼
(l−;(l0)−s), then −®su(l+) = ¯su(l−). So, ¯s > 0.
Case 1: 1
2u(l+) + 1
2u(l−) ≥ 0.33 Then V (1
2(l+;(l0)−s) ⊕ 1
2(l−;(l0)−s)) − U(l+;(l0)−s) =
±®s
1
2(u(l+) − u(l−)). Hence, 1
2(l+;(l0)−s) ⊕ 1
2(l−;(l0)−s) (l+;(l0)−s) if and only if ± ≥ 0.
Case 2: 1
2u(l+) + 1
2u(l−) ≤ 0. The proof is exactly the same as Case 1.
Next, we will show (ii). V (1
2(z+;(l0)−s) ⊕ 1
2(z−;(l0)−s)) = −1
2(1 − ±)(®s + ¯s). Hence,
(l0;(l0)−s)   1
2(x+;(l0)−s) ⊕ 1
2(x−;(l0)−s) if and only if ± ≤ 1.
D.2 Proof of Corollary 3
It is easy to see that (ii) implies (i) in the same way as Proposition 2. So, we will show that
(i) implies (ii). Fix two EAP Piecewise–linear preferences { i}i=1;2. Let Vi be as in Theorem
2 deﬁned by (±i;®i;¯i;ui). Let Ui be the restriction of Vi on F. By the same argument in
Proposition 2, there exist ® > 0 and ¯ such that u1 = ®u2 + ¯; Under the normalization of
ui by u1(z+) = 1 = u2(z+) and u1(z−) = −1 = u2(z−), a straightforward argument will show
U1 = U2. Hence, (®1;¯1) = (®2;¯2).
Suppose (®i;¯i) ̸= 0 to show ±1 ≥ ±2. Without loss generality assume ®i
s ̸= 0 for some
s ̸= 1. Deﬁne P = 1
2(z+;(l0)−s) ⊕ 1

















48u(Z) = R, there exists z ∈ Z such that V2(P) = u2(z). Then, −1
2(1−±2)(®2
s +¯2
s) = u2(z). If



















D.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose (a) and (b) hold. Let ®F = :2, ¯F = :9, ±F = :85, and u(z) = logz for all z ∈ R+.
Let V t be as in Theorem 2 deﬁned by (®t;¯t;±t;u) for all t ∈ {F;S}.
Part (ii) holds because V t(400;400) = log400 > log375 ≥ V t(375;750) for all t. In the
following, we will show (i). The payoﬀ function of player i with type t is denoted by Πt
i. Let
s∗
i be a strategy of player i such that the fair type (type F) play Ef and the selﬁsh type
(type S) play Eq. Given that the probability of fair type is :5, the payoﬀ of player i given
the opponent strategy s∗
j is deﬁned as follows:
ΠF
i (Ef|s∗
j) = V F(
:5(375;750) ⊕ :25(750;375) ⊕ :25(400;400)
)
≥ ±F 7:52 + (1 − ±F) 5:89;
ΠF
i (Eq|s∗
j) = V F(
:5(400;400) ⊕ :25(750;375) ⊕ :25(400;400)
)
≤ ±F 7:5 + (1 − ±F) 6:







j) = V S(





j) = V S(









2) and the prior probability consist a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium.
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